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Traditionally, Internet Access Providers (APs) only charge end-users for Internet access services; however, to recoup infrastructure
costs and increase revenues, some APs have recently adopted two-sided pricing schemes under which both end-users and content
providers are charged. Meanwhile, with the rapid growth of traffic, network congestion could seriously degrade user experiences and
influence providers’ utility. To optimize profit and social welfare, APs and regulators need to design appropriate pricing strategies and
regulatory policies that take the effects of network congestion into consideration. In this paper, we model two-sided networks under
which users’ traffic demands are influenced by exogenous pricing and endogenous congestion parameters and derive the system
congestion under an equilibrium. We characterize the structures and sensitivities of profit- and welfare-optimal two-sided pricing
schemes and reveal that 1) the elasticity of system throughput plays a crucial role in determining the structures of optimal pricing,
2) the changes of optimal pricing under varying AP’s capacity and users’ congestion sensitivity are largely driven by the type of
data traffic, e.g., text or video, and 3) APs and regulators will be incentivized to shift from one-sided to two-sided pricing when APs’
capacities and user demand for video traffic grow. Our results can help APs design optimal two-sided pricing and guide regulators to
legislate desirable policies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internet Access Providers (APs) build massive network platforms by which end-users and Content Providers (CPs) can
connect and transmit data to each other. Traditionally, APs use one-sided pricing schemes and obtain revenues mainly
from end-users. With the growing popularity of data-intensive services, e.g., online video streaming and cloud-based
applications, Internet traffic has been growing more than 50% per annum [10], causing serious network congestion,
especially during peak hours. To sustain such rapid traffic growth and enhance user experiences, APs need to upgrade
network infrastructures and expand capacities. However, they feel that the revenues from end-users are insufficient to
recoup the corresponding costs. Consequently, some APs have recently shifted towards two-sided pricing schemes, i.e.,
they start to impose termination fees on CPs’ data traffic in addition to charging the end-users. For example, Comcast1
and Netflix2 reached a paid peering agreement in 2014 [28], under which Comcast provides a direct connection to
Netflix and improve its content delivery quality for a fee. Another example is sponsored data proposed by AT&T3, under
which CPs are allowed to subsidize end-users the fees induced by their data traffic. Since subsidizations indirectly
transfer value to the APs, sponsored data is really a two-sided pricing scheme in disguise. Although charging CPs
directly or indirectly may increase APs’ revenues and thus motivate APs to deploy network capacities and alleviate
∗X. Wang’s email address is yixinxa@mail.ustc.edu.cn.
1ComcastXFINITY, http://www.xfinity.com
2Netflix, https://www.netflix.com
3AT&T Sponsored Data, www.att.com/att/sponsoreddata
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congestion, it has raised concerns over net neutrality [27], whose advocates argue that zero-pricing [11] on CPs are
needed to protect content innovations of the Internet. Although the U.S. FCC has recently passed the Open Internet
Order4 to protect net neutrality, existing two-sided schemes such as paid peering and sponsored data are exempt from
the ruling, because these pricing schemes are common practices in the Internet transit context and the FCC is not yet
clear about the policy implications on the utilities of various market participants and social welfare.
Although prior work [1, 16, 19] have studied the economics of two-sided pricing in network markets, the resulting
network congestion and its impacts on the utilities of different parties were often overlooked. However, the explosive
traffic growth has caused severe congestion in many regional and global networks, which degrades end-users’ expe-
riences and reduces their data demand. This will strongly affect the profits of APs and the utilities of end-users and
CPs. To optimize individual and social utilities, APs and regulators need to reflect the design of pricing strategies and
regulatory policies accordingly. So far, little is known about 1) the optimal two-sided pricing structure in a congested
network and its changes under varying system parameters, e.g., the users’ congestion sensitivity and the APs’ capacities,
and 2) potential regulations on two-sided pricing for protecting social welfare from monopolistic providers. To address
these questions, one challenge is to accurately capture the endogenous congestion in the network. Although the level
of congestion is influenced by network throughput, the users’ traffic demand and throughput are also influenced by
network congestion. It is crucial to capture this endogenous congestion so as to faithfully characterize the impacts of
two-sided pricing in congested networks.
In this paper, we propose a novel model of a two-sided congested network built by an AP, which transmits data
traffic between end-users and CPs. We model network congestion as a function of AP’s capacity and system throughput,
which is also affected by the congestion level. We capture users’ population and traffic demand under pricing and
congestion parameters and derive an endogenous system congestion under an equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium
model, we analyze the structures of profit-optimal and welfare-optimal two-sided pricing and their sensitivities under
varying system environments, e.g., congestion sensitivity of users and capacity of the AP. We also compare the two
types of optimal pricing and derive regulatory implications. Our main contributions and findings include the following.
• We derive the congestion equilibrium of two-sided networks, identify a property of elasticity (Theorem 3.6 and
3.8), and study the equilibrium dynamics under varying pricing and system parameters (Proposition 3.7 and
3.9).
• We characterize the structures of optimal two-sided pricing (Theorem 4.2 and 4.4) and show that the profit-
optimal pricing equalizes the demand hazard rates on the user and CP sides; however, the welfare-optimal
counterpart differentiates them based on the elasticity of throughput and per-unit traffic welfare of both sides.
• We analyze the sensitivities of optimal two-sided prices under varying capacity of APs (Corollary 5.2 and
5.3) and congestion sensitivity of users (Corollary 5.5 and 5.6). The results imply that when network traffic is
mainly for online video, APs would increase two-sided prices under expanded capacity, while regulators may
want to tighten the price regulation on the side of higher market power. However, when network traffic is
mostly for text content, they should take the opposite operations.
• We compare two-sided pricing with the traditional one-sided counterpart. We find that with the growing
capacities of APs and demand for video traffic, APs and regulators will have strong incentives to shift from
one-sided to two-sided pricing because the benefits of increased profits and social welfare will continue to
grow.
4The U.S. FCC’s Open Internet Order, https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-open-internet-order
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We believe that our model and analysis could help APs design two-sided pricing schemes in congested networks and
guide regulatory authorities to legislate desirable policies.
2 RELATEDWORK
Several works have studied two-sided pricing in the Internet markets. Njoroge et al. [19] showed that two-sided pricing
could help APs extract higher profits and maintain higher investment levels than one-sided pricing. Altman et al. [1]
analyzed the impacts of CP’s revenue models, either subscription or advertisement, on AP’s pricing strategies. Choi
and Kim [20] found that expanding capacity will decrease the CP-side price. In [16], Musacchio et al. concluded that
two-sided pricing is more favorable in terms of social welfare than one-sided pricing when the ratio between CPs’
advertising rates and user price sensitivity are extreme. All of the above works do not consider the impact of network
congestion on user throughput, which strongly influences the AP’s pricing strategy. In this paper, we characterize the
interactions among network congestion, throughput, and price, based on which we analyze both the profit-optimal and
welfare-optimal pricing.
Whether APs should be allowed to charge CPs for their content traffic has been a focus of debate on net neutrality
[27]. To sidestep this debate and extract revenue from CPs, some APs, e.g., AT&T, have recently provided sponsored
data plans, which allow CPs to partially or fully subsidize users the fees induced by their data traffic for increasing
market share. Since the sponsorship offers a way for CPs to subsidize their users and indirectly transfer value to APs, it
could be seen as a variant of the two-sided pricing model. Some work [2, 14, 29] have studied this variant and showed
that it benefits both CPs and APs. Because APs charge users different prices for content traffic from different CPs,
the sponsored data plan is also considered as a type of price discrimination in disguise and has raised concerns from
the FCC who says that they will be monitoring and prepared to intervene if necessary [18]. In this paper, rather than
pursuing the price differentiation, we focus on the two-sided pricing under which users are charged entirely based on
their traffic volumes.
From the perspective of modeling and analysis, our model extends Rochet and Tirole [23], in which the two-sided
network platforms do not incur congestion. To capture the endogenous network congestion and its effect in Internet
markets, we introduce a system congestion under a market equilibrium and use a gain function to model the decline
degrees of network throughput under different congestion levels. Besides, we also analyze the sensitivities of two-sided
pricing under the varying network environments, which are instructive and meaningful for APs and regulators to
adjust pricing schemes and regulatory policies with the evolution of the Internet. Ma [13] and Chander and Leruth
[4] also consider the service markets with congestion externalities. Ma [13] analyzed the pay-as-you-go pricing and
competition among multiple ISPs. Chander and Leruth [4] studied the quality differentiation strategy of a monopoly
provider. Both of them focused on the one-sided markets while we consider the more general two-sided markets.
3 MACROSCOPIC NETWORK MODEL
We consider a two-sided network platform built by an AP which transmits data traffic between users and CPs. Unlike
physical commodities, the quality of network service is intricately influenced by a negative network effect: higher
traffic will induce a more congested network with worse performance. To characterize the congestion, we start with a
macroscopic model that captures the physical and economic dynamics among the AP, users, and CPs in this section.
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3.1 Basic Terms and Definitions
As a preliminary, we first introduce two basic economic and statistical terms that will be used in our model.
Definition 3.1 (Elasticity). For two variables x and y, the elasticity of y with respect to x , or x-elasticity of y, is defined
by ϵyx ≜
x
y
∂y
∂x
.
In economics, elasticity captures the responsiveness of a variable y to a change in another variable x . Specifically, it
can be equivalently expressed as ϵyx = |(∂y/y)/(∂x/x)| and interpreted as the absolute value of the percentage change
in y (numerator) in response to the percentage change in x (denominator). Intuitively, when the value ϵyx is higher, y
responds to the change of x more strongly and we say that y is more elastic to x .
Definition 3.2 (Hazard Rate). For a function y(x), the hazard rate of y with respect to x is defined by y˜x ≜ − 1
y
∂y
∂x
.
In statistics, hazard rate is used to measure the rate of decrease in the function y with respect to the variable x . In
particular, it can be expressed as yx = −(∂y/y)/∂x and interpreted as the proportion of y that is reduced due to a
marginal change of x . Note that the function y can have different values of its hazard rate at different starting points of
the variable x .
3.2 Baseline Physical Model
We denote a metric of congestion, e.g., delay or loss rate, by ϕ to model the congestion level of the AP’s network. We
denote the AP’s user population bym and the users’ average desirable throughput by n, i.e., the maximum amount of
data rate consumed under a congestion-free network with ϕ = 0. When network congestion exists, i.e., ϕ > 0, the users’
desirable throughput might not be fulfilled; and therefore, their achievable throughput is lower than their desirable
throughput. We define the users’ average achievable throughput under a congestion level ϕ by l(ϕ) ≜ nρ(ϕ), i.e., the
desirable throughput n multiplied by a gain factor ρ(ϕ).
Assumption 3.3. ρ(ϕ) : R+ 7→ (0, 1] is a continuously differentiable, decreasing function of ϕ. It has an upper bound
ρ(0) = 1 and satisfies that lim
ϕ→+∞
ρ(ϕ) = 0.
Assumption 3.3 states that the throughput gain or simply the gain decreases monotonically when the network
congestion ϕ deteriorates. In particular, the gain and the users’ achievable throughput reach the maximum under no
congestion.
In practice, users’ throughput is usually a mixture of multiple types of traffic flows. Based on the characteristics of
applications and protocols, different types of traffic throughput may have dissimilar responses to network congestion.
For instance, inelastic traffic such as online video streaming cannot tolerate high delays and loss rates, and therefore its
throughput gain declines sharply with the deterioration of congestion; however, the throughput gain of elastic traffic
[25] such as e-mail does not respond to congestion drastically. Notice that the terms inelastic traffic and elastic traffic
in networking refer to the traffic whose throughput gains are sensitive and insensitive to congestion, respectively;
however, based on the classic definition of elasticity in economics (i.e., Definition 3.1), traffic throughput has higher
congestion elasticity if it is more sensitive to congestion, and therefore the throughput gain of inelastic traffic is more
elastic to congestion than that of elastic traffic.
In this paper, we adopt the elasticity defined in economics to characterize how the throughput gain responds to
congestion. By Definition 3.1, the elasticity ϵρϕ characterizes the percentage decrease in the gain ρ in response to the
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percentage increase in the congestion ϕ. Based on this characterization, different forms of the gain function ρ(ϕ) with
different elasticities ϵρϕ can be used to model responses of different mixtures of traffic types to congestion. For example,
when users’ traffic throughput includes more online video or file sharing traffic, gain functions with higher or lower
elasticities can be adopted, respectively.
Given a fixed level of congestion ϕ, we define the aggregate network throughput by λ(ϕ) ≜ ml(ϕ) =mnρ(ϕ), i.e., the
product of the number of usersm and the users’ average achievable throughput nρ(ϕ) under the congestion level ϕ.
On the one hand, under the given level ϕ of congestion, the network accommodates certain throughput λ(ϕ); on the
other hand, the network congestion ϕ is also influenced by this throughput λ. We denote the AP’s capacity by µ and
characterize the induced system congestion as a function ϕ ≜ Φ(λ, µ) of the system throughput λ and capacity µ.
Assumption 3.4. Φ(λ, µ) : R2+ 7→ R+ is continuously differentiable, increasing in λ, decreasing in µ.
Assumption 3.4 characterizes the physics of network congestion: the congestion level is higher when the system
accommodates larger throughput or has less capacity, and vice-versa. Besides, different forms of the congestion function
Φ can be adopted to capture the congestion metric based on different models of network services. For example, the
function Φ(λ, µ) = 1/(µ − λ) models the M/M/1 queueing delay for network services and Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ captures the
capacity sharing [5] nature of general network congestion.
By far, we have described the system by a triple (m,n, µ). Because the congestion increases with the network
throughput, which decreases with the deteriorated congestion, the resulting system congestion is defined under an
equilibrium.
Definition 3.5. ϕ is an induced equilibrium congestion of a system (m,n, µ) if and only if it satisfies ϕ = Φ(λ(ϕ), µ) .
Definition 3.5 states that the system congestion ϕ should induce the aggregate throughput λ(ϕ) such that it leads to
exactly the same level of congestion ϕ = Φ(λ, µ).
We define the inverse function of Φ(λ, µ) with respect to λ by Λ(ϕ, µ) ≜ Φ−1(ϕ, µ). Λ(ϕ, µ) can be interpreted as the
implied amount of throughput that induces a congestion level ϕ for a system with a capacity µ. By Assumption 3.4,
Λ(ϕ, µ) is strictly increasing in both ϕ and µ. To characterize the system congestion, we define a gap function д(ϕ)
between the supply and demand of throughput under a fixed level of congestion ϕ by
д(ϕ) ≜ Λ (ϕ, µ) − λ(ϕ).
Theorem 3.6 (Congestion Eqilibrium). For any system (m,n, µ), д(ϕ) is an increasing function of ϕ. The system
operates at a unique level of equilibrium congestion ϕ, which solves д(ϕ) = 0.
Theorem 3.6 characterizes the uniqueness of the system equilibrium congestion ϕ under which the throughput
supply Λ(ϕ, µ) equals the aggregate throughput demand λ(ϕ). Based on Theorem 3.6, we denote the unique equilibrium
congestion and the corresponding aggregate throughput of the system (m,n, µ) by φ = φ(m,n, µ) and λ = λ(m,n, µ),
respectively. We define the marginal change of the throughput gap д due to a marginal change in the congestion ϕ by
∂д
∂ϕ
≜
∂Λ(ϕ, µ)
∂ϕ
−mndρ(ϕ)
dϕ
> 0,
where the first (second) term captures the change of throughput in supply (demand). Next, we characterize the impacts
of the user populationm, users’ average desirable throughput n and system capacity µ on the system congestion φ and
throughput λ as functions of ∂д/∂φ and ∂Λ/∂φ as follows.
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Proposition 3.7. The user populationm’s impacts on the system congestion φ and throughput λ are
∂φ
∂m
=
(
∂д
∂φ
)−1 λ
m
> 0 and ∂λ
∂m
=
∂Λ
∂φ
∂φ
∂m
> 0.
The desirable throughput n’s impacts on φ and λ are
∂φ
∂n
=
(
∂д
∂φ
)−1 λ
n
> 0 and ∂λ
∂n
=
∂Λ
∂φ
∂φ
∂n
> 0.
The system capacity µ’s impacts on φ and λ are
∂φ
∂µ
= − ∂Λ
∂µ
(
∂д
∂φ
)−1
< 0 and ∂λ
∂µ
=mn
dρ
dφ
∂φ
∂µ
> 0.
Proposition 3.7 derives the impacts ofm, n and µ on the induced system congestion φ and throughput λ. It states that
1) if the user populationm or the desirable throughput n increases, the system congestion and throughput will increase,
and 2) if the AP extends its capacity µ, the system congestion will decrease and the system throughput will increase.
Theorem 3.8 (Elasticity of Throughput). Under the equilibrium of any system (m,n, µ), the elasticities of the
system throughput λ with respect to the user populationm and the desirable throughput n are equal and both satisfy
ϵλm = ϵ
λ
n =
(
1 + |∂λ/∂φ |
∂Λ/∂φ
)−1
∈ (0, 1] .
Theorem 3.8 shows that under an equilibrium of any physical system (m,n, µ), the marginal impact of user population
on the system throughput ϵλm equals that of the user’s desirable throughput on the system throughput ϵλn . Fundamentally,
this result is due to the product form of network throughput λ =mnρ(φ) that is symmetric inm and n, although both
quantities have very different physical natures. Thus, we define this elasticity of system throughput by
ϵλ ≜
(
1 + |∂λ/∂φ |
∂Λ/∂φ
)−1
=
(
1 +mn |dρ/dφ |
∂Λ/∂φ
)−1
, (1)
where |∂λ/∂φ | and ∂Λ/∂φ measure the marginal decrease and increase in the throughput demand and supply with
respect to congestion, respectively. This ϵλ can be interpreted as a metric of relative congestion elasticity of throughput
demand: when the traffic demand is elastic, i.e., |∂λ/∂φ | is large, and the throughput supply is inelastic, i.e., ∂Λ/∂φ
is small, ϵλ → 0 and the system can accommodate higher throughput mostly due to the elasticity of the demand;
otherwise, ϵλ → 1 and the elasticity of the supply plays a bigger role in adopting higher throughput. Notice that our
model generalizes that of Rochet and Tirole [23], under which congestion does not exist and the throughput supply can
be regarded to be infinitely elastic, i.e., ∂Λ/∂φ = +∞, and therefore, the elasticity of throughput alway satisfies ϵλ = 1.
3.3 Two-Sided Pricing Model
We consider usage-based pricing schemes [7] imposed on users and CPs, which are adopted by most wireless APs, e.g.,
T-Mobile5 and AT&T, and some wired APs, e.g., Comcast [8]. In our two-sided pricing model, we assume that the AP
charges prices of p and q per-unit data traffic to users and CPs, respectively.
On the user side, we model each user by her value vu of per-unit traffic and denote the number of the users of value
vu by fu (vu ), which can be regarded as a value density function of users. We assume that a user subscribes to the AP’s
access service if and only if she can obtain a positive utility, i.e., her value vu of per-unit traffic is higher than the price
5T-Mobile, http://www.t-mobile.com
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p. As a result, the populationm of active users of the AP is a function of p, defined by
m(p) ≜
∫ +∞
p
fu (vu )dvu . (2)
On the CP side, we model each CP by a tuple (uc ,vc ). uc is the average desirable throughput of end-users for the
CP’s content. vc is the CP’s per-unit traffic value, which models the CP’s profit obtained by charging its customers or
advertisers. Similar to the user side, we denote the density of the CPs of characteristic (uc ,vc ) by fc (uc ,vc ) and assume
that a CP uses the AP’s access service if and only if it can obtain a positive utility, i.e., its value vc of per-unit traffic is
higher than the price q. Consequently, the average desirable throughput n of end-users for all active CPs is a function
of q, defined by
n(q) ≜
∫ +∞
q
∫ +∞
0
uc fc (uc ,vc )ducdvc . (3)
From Equation (2) and (3), we know that the populationm(p) of users decreases with the user-side price p, and
the average desirable throughput n(q) of users decreases with the CP-side price q. Since the two-sided prices p and q
impact the network throughput λ via the user populationm and the average desirable throughput n, respectively,m(p)
and n(q) can be interpreted as demand functions on the user and CP sides. Intuitively, the higher price p (q) results in
the smaller demandm (n) on the user (CP) side. Furthermore, by Definition 3.2, we adopt the hazard rate m˜p (n˜q ) to
measure the decreasing rate of the demandm (n) with respect to the price p (q). In addition, the inverse of the hazard
rate 1/m˜p (1/n˜q ) is often regarded as the AP’s market power [26] on the user (CP) side, which reflects the AP’s ability
to profitably raise the price of its network service. Intuitively, if the AP has higher market power on the user (CP) side,
i.e., the demand hazard rate m˜p (n˜q ) is lower, the AP can set a higher price p (q) to optimize its profit, since the demand
m (n) decreases slower with the price.
Under a two-sided pricing (p,q), the aggregate network throughput can be represented as λ(p,q,ϕ) ≜ m(p)n(q)ρ(ϕ),
i.e., the product of the AP’s user populationm(p), the users’ average desirable throughput n(q), and the throughput
gain factor ρ(ϕ) under the congestion level ϕ. Furthermore, we can write the unique equilibrium congestion as
φ(p,q, µ) ≜ φ(m(p),n(q), µ) and define the corresponding system throughput by λ(p,q, µ) ≜ λ(p,q,φ(p,q, µ)). As the
prices p and q determine the congestion φ(p,q, µ) and throughput λ(p,q, µ) under any fixed capacity µ, we investigate
their impacts on the congestion and the throughput as follows.
Proposition 3.9. For a system with a fixed capacity, the system congestion φ and throughput λ under two-sided prices
p and q satisfy
∂φ
∂p
= −
(
∂д
∂φ
)−1
λm˜p < 0 and ∂λ
∂p
=
∂Λ
∂φ
∂φ
∂p
< 0;
∂φ
∂q
= −
(
∂д
∂φ
)−1
λn˜q < 0 and ∂λ
∂q
=
∂Λ
∂φ
∂φ
∂q
< 0.
Furthermore, the price elasticities of throughput λ satisfy
ϵλp : ϵλq = ϵmp : ϵnq .
Proposition 3.9 explicitly shows the impacts of prices p and q on the system congestion φ and throughput λ and
states that the congestion and throughput will decrease if higher prices are charged. Intuitively, higher prices reduce the
demands in terms ofm and n, which further reduce the equilibrium congestion φ by Proposition 3.7. As the system has
a fixed capacity, the aggregate throughput λ = Λ(φ, µ) would decrease consequently. Proposition 3.9 also tells that the
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price elasticity of throughput is proportional to that of the corresponding demand. This again shows that the demands
m and n play similar roles on the two sides of the market.
4 STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL PRICING
In the previous section, we modeled a two-sided network in which the effect of congestion is taken into consideration.
In this section, we further explore the structures of the profit-optimal and welfare-optimal pricing in the network. In
particular, we will show the impact of system congestion on the structures of optimal pricing.
4.1 Structure of Profit-Optimal Pricing
We first study the optimal two-sided pricing used by the AP to maximize its profit. We assume that the AP incurs a
per-unit traffic cost of c , which models the recurring maintenance and utility costs like electricity. We define the AP’s
profit byU (p,q, µ) ≜ (p + q − c)λ(p,q, µ), i.e., the per unit traffic profit p + q − c multiplied by the aggregate throughput
λ. Under any fixed capacity µ, the AP can maximize its profit by determining the optimal prices that solve the following
optimization problem.
maximize
p,q
U (p,q, µ) = (p + q − c)λ(p,q, µ).
Before solving the profit maximization problem, we first characterize the impacts of the AP’s capacity and prices on
its profit as the following result.
Proposition 4.1. The impact of the capacity µ on the profitU is
∂U
∂µ
= (p + q − c) ∂Λ
∂µ
(1 − ϵλ) > 0,
and the impacts of the prices p and q on the profitU are
∂U
∂p
= λ − (p + q − c)ϵλλm˜p ;
∂U
∂q
= λ − (p + q − c)ϵλλn˜q .
Proposition 4.1 intuitively shows that the AP’s profit increases with its capacity under fixed prices; however, increasing
prices might reduce demands, which could either increase or decrease the profit. Next, we characterize the optimal
two-sided prices of the AP that maximize its profit.
Theorem 4.2. If prices p and q maximize the AP’s profit, the following condition must hold:
m˜p = n˜q =
1
(p + q − c)ϵλ . (4)
Furthermore, the total price p + q satisfies
p + q − c
p + q
=
1
ϵλp + ϵ
λ
q
=
1
ϵλ(ϵmp + ϵnq )
. (5)
Theorem 4.2 provides necessary conditions for prices to be profit-optimal. Equation (4) shows the connections among
the optimal prices, the demand hazard rates on both sides, and the elasticity of system throughput. In particular, the
optimal prices will equalize the hazard rates of demands on both sides, which equals the inverse of the product of
the profit margin p + q − c and the elasticity of system throughput ϵλ . This implies that the AP will always balance
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its market power on both sides of the market so as to maximize its profit. Notice that the formula of Equation (4)
also generalizes the result of Rochet and Tirole [23] for the structure of the profit-optimal two-sided pricing under
endogenously congested networks. Besides, Equation (5) characterizes the relationship between the elasticities and
price margins of the profit-maximizing AP, where the total price p + q follows a form of the Lerner index [12], i.e., the
ratio of profit margin to price equals the inverse of the total elasticities of the system throughput with respect to the
prices.
By Equation (4), we see that the profit-optimal two-sided prices are related to the elasticity of system throughput
ϵλ , which depends on the level of network congestion by Equation (1). To see more clearly, we illustrate it with an
example where the gain function is ρ(ϕ) = e−ϕ , the congestion function is Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ and the demand functions are
m(p) = 1 − p and n(q) = (1 − q)2 (p,q ∈ [0, 1]). For this example, we can derive the explicit profit-optimal prices based
on Theorem 4.2:
p =
φ + c + 2
φ + 4 and q =
φ + 2c
φ + 4 (6)
where φ is the equilibrium congestion of the system. Equation (6) shows that the congestion level directly affects the
profit-optimal prices. Therefore, the AP should fully take the congestion effect into consideration when designing
two-sided pricing schemes.
4.2 Structure of Welfare-Optimal Pricing
We next analyze the welfare-optimal pricing structure that maximizes social welfare and contrast it with the profit-
optimal counterpart. On the user side, given any fixed price p, a user of valuevu obtains the surplus (vu −p) for per-unit
traffic, and therefore the total surplus of all users, when each of them consumes one unit traffic, can be defined by
Sm (p) ≜
∫ +∞
p
(vu − p)fu (vu )dvu , (7)
where fu (vu ) measures the population of the users of value vu for per-unit traffic. Thus the per-user average surplus
for per-unit traffic can be defined by sm (p) ≜ Sm (p)/m(p), wherem(p) is the user population. Accordingly, we define
the total user welfare for the aggregate throughput by
Wm (p,q, µ) ≜ sm (p)λ(p,q, µ) = Sm (p)n(q)ρ
(
φ(p,q, µ)),
i.e., the users’ average per-unit traffic surplus sm (p) multiplied by the aggregate traffic throughput λ(p,q, µ). Similarly,
on the CP side, given any fixed termination fee q, a CP of characteristic (uc ,vc ) generates a surplus (vc −q) for per-unit
traffic and the average desirable throughput per user on this CP is uc ; and therefore, the CP can obtain a surplus of
(vc −q)uc per user. As a result, the total surplus of all active CPs, when each of them accommodates their users’ average
desirable throughput, can be defined by
Sn (q) ≜
∫ +∞
q
∫ +∞
0
(vc − q)uc fc (uc ,vc )ducdvc ,
where fc (uc ,vc ) measures the population of the CPs of characteristic (uc ,vc ). Thus, the total surplus of all active CPs
for per-unit traffic can be defined by sn (q) ≜ Sn (q)/n(q), where n(q) is the end-users’ average desirable throughput on
all active CPs. Accordingly, we define the total CP welfare generated from all end-users by
Wn (p,q, µ) ≜ sn (q)λ(p,q, µ) = Sn (q)m(p)ρ
(
φ(p,q, µ)),
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i.e., the aggregate per-unit traffic CP surplus sn (q) multiplied by the aggregate traffic throughput λ(p,q, µ). Notice that
because the welfareWm (p,q, µ) andWn (p,q, µ) of the two sides are the system throughput λ(p,q, µ)multiplied by sm (p)
and sn (q), respectively, sm and sn can also be interpreted as the per-unit traffic welfare of the user and CP sides. Based
on the above definitions, social welfare can be denoted as the summation of the end-users’ welfare, the CPs’ welfare,
and the AP’s profit, defined by
W (p,q, µ) ≜Wm (p,q, µ) +Wn (p,q, µ) +U (p,q, µ).
Because social welfare usually increases as the two-sided prices decrease, it might be maximized at a point where
the AP incurs a loss. To ensure that the AP does not incur a loss and the welfare-optimal pricing scheme is practically
feasible, we consider the framework of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing [21] which tries to maximize social welfare, subject to a
constraint on the AP’s profit. In our context, we typically constrain the AP’s profit to be zero, i.e.,U = 0, under which
the total price p + q is equal to the traffic cost c . We formulate the welfare optimization problem as follows.
maximize
p,q
W (p,q, µ) =Wm (p,q, µ) +Wn (p,q, µ)
subject to p + q = c .
Before we solve the welfare maximization problem, we first characterize the impacts of the capacity and prices on
social welfare as follows.
Proposition 4.3. The impact of the AP’s capacity µ on social welfareW is
∂W
∂µ
=W ρ˜φ
∂Λ
∂µ
(
∂д
∂φ
)−1
> 0.
The impacts of the AP’s prices p and q on social welfareW are
∂W
∂p
= −λ − m˜p [Wn −W (1 − ϵλ)] ;
∂W
∂q
= −λ − n˜q [Wm −W (1 − ϵλ)] .
In particular, if S˜pm and S˜
q
n increase with p and q, respectively, social welfareW decreases with p and q.
Proposition 4.3 intuitively shows that 1) under fixed prices, social welfare increases with the AP’s capacity, and 2)
under the commonly assumed monotone conditions [3] on the hazard rates S˜pm and S˜
q
n of surpluses, social welfare
decreases as the two-sided prices increase. It implies that to protect social welfare, regulators should encourage APs
to expand capacity and regulate the prices of both sides. Next, we characterize the optimal two-sided prices which
maximize social welfare.
Theorem 4.4. If prices p and q maximize the social welfareW (p,q), the following condition must hold:
m˜p : n˜q =
(
ϵλ − 1 + sm
sm + sn
)
:
(
ϵλ − 1 + sn
sm + sn
)
. (8)
Theorem 4.4 provides a necessary condition for the prices to bewelfare-optimal. Equation (8) describes the relationship
among the elasticity of system throughput, the demand hazard rates and per-unit traffic welfares of the two sides.
Compared to the result of Theorem 4.2 where the profit-optimal pricing always equalizes the demand hazard rates on
both sides, the welfare-optimal counterpart differentiates them based on the per-unit traffic welfares of the two sides
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as well as the elasticity of system throughput. To see this more clearly, we consider a special case of ϵλ = 1, i.e., the
model of Rochet and Tirole [23] where network congestion does not exist. Under this case, Equation (8) simplifies to
the condition in Proposition 2 of [23], i.e.,
sm
m˜p
=
sn
n˜q
. (9)
Equation (9) shows that when the congestion does not exist, the demand hazard rate is proportional to the per-unit
traffic welfare of the same side under the welfare-optimal pricing. This implies that the welfare-optimal prices result
in a higher demand hazard rate, and therefore induce lower market power, on the side of higher welfare. When the
network becomes mildly congested, the elasticity of system throughput ϵλ will slightly decline below 1. If the AP has
higher per-unit traffic welfare on the user side, i.e., sm > sn , the right-hand side of Equation (8) will increase. Since
Equation (8) has to hold under the welfare-optimal pricing, the prices need to adjust to balance the equation again, i.e.,
to increase the ratio of demand hazard rates on the left-hand side of Equation (8). This implies that the market power of
the side of high per-unit traffic welfare will decrease, and vice versa. In general, we can expect that when the network
becomes more congested, the elasticity of throughput decreases, and under the welfare-optimal pricing, the ratio of the
demand hazard rates of the sides with higher and lower per-unit traffic welfare will further increase.
Similar to the profit-optimal prices, the welfare-optimal prices are also related with the elasticity of throughput ϵλ
by Equation (8), which depends on the level of network congestion by Equation (1). Under the same example where the
gain function is ρ(ϕ) = e−ϕ , the congestion function is Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ and the demand functions arem(p) = 1 − p and
n(q) = (1 − q)2 (p,q ∈ [0, 1]), the explicit welfare-optimal prices can be derived based on Theorem 4.4:
p =
3k(φ) + 2c − 2
3k(φ) + 2 and q =
3(c − 1)k(φ) + 2
3k(φ) + 2 (10)
where k(φ) is the positive solution of 3k2 + φk − 4 = 0 and φ is the equilibrium congestion of the system. Equation (10)
shows that the congestion level also directly affects the welfare-optimal prices. Thus, regulators need to consider the
congestion effect adequately when making the regulatory policies on the two-sided pricing.
Summary of Implications: The theoretical results in this section could help APs and regulatory authorities to
design two-sided pricing strategies and the corresponding regulatory policies. First, to optimize their profits, APs should
set two-sided prices to equalize the demand hazard rates at both sides, whose optimal value changes with the elasticity
of system throughput (by Theorem 4.2). Second, to protect social welfare, regulators might want to regulate the prices
of both sides (by Proposition 4.3). In particular, the prices should be regulated such that the difference in the demand
hazard rates of the two sides will enlarge as the elasticity of system throughput decreases (by Theorem 4.4).
5 SENSITIVITY OF OPTIMAL PRICING
With the rapid development of Internet, characteristics of APs, CPs, and end-users are continuously changing. For
example, APs are using new wireless technologies, e.g., 4G or 5G, to expand their capacities, and as the real-time
video traffic grows rapidly, users often become more sensitive to network congestion. In this section, we explore
the sensitivities of the profit-optimal and welfare-optimal pricing under these varying characteristics of the market
participants.
Because Theorem 4.2 and 4.4 in the previous section only provide necessary conditions for the two-sided prices p
and q to be profit- and welfare-optimal, they are not sufficient to guarantee the optimality. To analyze how the optimal
prices change with varying parameters, we make the following assumption on the hazard rates of the demandsm and n
so as to guarantee the (local) optimality of the prices p and q.
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Assumption 5.1. The demand hazard rates m˜p and n˜q are increasing in the prices p and q, respectively.
The monotonicity conditions on the demand hazard rates m˜p and n˜q stated in Assumption 5.1 indicate that at a
higher price level p (q), the proportion of demandm (n) reduced due to a marginal increase in price is larger. These
monotone conditions are widely assumed in various contexts in statistics [3] and economics, e.g., Myerson’s optimal
auction [17]. In particular, the hazard rate of any concave function satisfies the monotone property, e.g., a concave
demandm(p) implies that the hazard rate m˜p must be increasing in p. Under Assumption 5.1, we consider a system that
has unique profit-optimal and welfare-optimal two-sided prices, denoted by (p∗,q∗) and (p◦,q◦), respectively.
As the previous section shows that the structure of optimal pricing depends on the elasticity of throughput ϵλ ,
we will see in this section that the sensitivities of optimal prices largely depend on the changing direction of ϵλ as
congestion increases, i.e., the sign of ∂ϵλ/∂φ. This quantity is determined by the type of data traffic: if the network
traffic is mostly video (text), its throughput gain ρ(φ) often decreases convexly (concavely) in φ, as its traffic is quite
sensitive (insensitive) to mild congestion. As a result, we will show that ϵλ often increases (decreases) when congestion
increases.
5.1 Impact of AP’s Capacity
In this subsection, we first show how the sensitivity of optimal pricing under varying AP’s capacity is impacted by the
changing direction of ϵλ under changing congestion. We then explain why this changing direction is determined by the
type of data traffic. The following two corollaries show the impacts of the AP’s capacity µ on the optimal prices.
Corollary 5.2. The derivatives of the profit-optimal prices p∗ and q∗ with respect to the capacity µ satisfy that
sgn
( ∂p∗
∂µ
)
= sgn
( ∂q∗
∂µ
)
= sgn
( ∂ϵλ
∂φ
)
.
Furthermore, their ratio satisfies that
∂p∗
∂µ
: ∂q
∗
∂µ
=
dn˜q
dq
: dm˜
p
dp
. (11)
Corollary 5.2 shows that the signs of the marginal profit-optimal prices ∂p∗/∂µ and ∂q∗/∂µ (with respect to capacity)
are the same as that of the marginal elasticity of system throughput ∂ϵλ/∂φ (with respect to congestion). This result
implies that if the elasticity of system throughput increases with deteriorated congestion, the AP’s profit-optimal
prices will increase with its capacity, and vice-versa. In general, the system congestion φ will be alleviated with the
expanded capacity µ by Proposition 3.7. If the elasticity of throughput decreases (increases) with alleviated congestion,
i.e., ∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0 (∂ϵλ/∂φ < 0), the marginal increase of throughput demand |∂λ/∂φ | increases faster (slower) than that
of throughput supply ∂Λ/∂φ by Equation (1). As a result, the profit-optimal prices will increase (decrease) as the basic
economics principle of demand and supply implies.
Furthermore, Equation (11) shows that the marginal profit-optimal prices (with respect to capacity) are proportional
to the marginal demand hazard rate (with respect to price) on the opposite sides. Because the profit-optimal prices
always equalize the demand hazard rates of both sides by Theorem 4.2, i.e., m˜p (p∗) = n˜q (q∗), the changes in demand
hazard rates with respect to capacity µ should also be the same at both sides. Mathematically, this balanced marginal
effect can be used to deduce Equation (11) and expressed as
∂p∗
∂µ
dm˜p
dp
=
∂m˜p
∂µ
=
∂n˜q
∂µ
=
∂q∗
∂µ
dn˜q
dq
.
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Corollary 5.3. The derivatives of the welfare-optimal prices p◦ and q◦ with respect to the capacity µ satisfy that
sgn
( ∂p◦
∂µ
)
= − sgn
( ∂q◦
∂µ
)
= sgn
(
m˜p − n˜q ) · sgn ( ∂ϵλ
∂φ
)
.
Corollary 5.3 shows that the marginal prices ∂p◦/∂µ and ∂q◦/∂µ with respect to capacity have opposite signs. This
is due to the constraint of fixed total price of the two sides, which further implies that the values of ∂p◦/∂µ and ∂q◦/∂µ
are always opposite. Corollary 5.3 also shows that the sign of marginal price of the side of higher (lower) demand hazard
rate will be the same as (opposite to) that of the marginal elasticity of throughput. This implies that if the elasticity of
throughput increases (decreases) with congestion, the welfare-optimal price of the side whose demand hazard rate
is higher would increase (decrease) with the capacity. As explained earlier, if the elasticity of throughput increases
with expanded capacity and alleviated congestion, i.e., ∂ϵλ/∂φ < 0, the marginal increase of throughput demand
|∂λ/∂φ | increases slower than that of throughput supply ∂Λ/∂φ. As a result, the network would be under-utilized if
the two-sided prices are unchanged, and therefore under fixed total price, the price of the side of higher demand hazard
rate should be reduced to increase system throughput so as to maximize social welfare. Similarly, if ∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0, the
network would be overloaded and the price of the side of higher demand hazard rate should be increased to reduce the
throughput.
By comparing the results of Corollary 5.2 and 5.3, we see that if the elasticity of throughput ϵλ increases (decreases)
with congestion φ, the price of the side of lower demand hazard rate will decrease (increase) with capacity under the
welfare-optimal pricing but will increase (decrease) with capacity under the profit-optimal counterpart. This suggests
that, to protect social welfare, if ϵλ increases (decreases) with φ, regulators might want to tighten (relax) the price
regulation on the side of higher AP market power, i.e., the side of lower demand hazard rate, when APs expand capacities.
From Corollary 5.2 and 5.3, we have seen that under expanded capacity, the sensitivities of both profit- and welfare-
optimal prices really depend on the changing direction of ϵλ with deteriorated congestion, i.e., the sign of ∂ϵλ/∂φ.
Next, we explain why it is determined by the type of data traffic. From Equation (1), the elasticity of throughput ϵλ is
a function of the marginal gain |∂ρ/∂φ | and supply ∂Λ/∂φ of throughput. The former and the latter are determined
by the type of data traffic, e.g., text or video, and the congestion model of network service, e.g., capacity sharing [5]
or M/M/1 queue, respectively. Since the congestion model is usually fixed, while the data type changes rapidly with
the emerging new applications and contents, we focus on the impact of data traffic type. For example, we consider
the congestion function Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ that captures the capacity sharing nature of network services. As mentioned
at the beginning of this section, when the data traffic is mostly for online video (text content), the throughput gain
ρ(φ) often decreases convexly (concavely) in congestion φ and thus is more (less) elastic as the congestion is milder.
Consequently, the congestion elasticity of gain ϵρφ usually decreases (increases) with congestion. The next proposition
builds the relationship between ϵρφ and the elasticity of system throughput ϵλ .
Proposition 5.4. If the network congestion meets the form Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ, the elasticity of system throughput satisfies
that
ϵλ =
1
1 + ϵρφ
∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 5.4 implies that under capacity sharing, the elasticity of throughput ϵλ will increase as the congestion
elasticity of gain ϵρφ decreases. Furthermore, if the network traffic is mostly for text content (online video), the congestion
elasticity of gain ϵρφ usually increases (decreases) with congestion, resulting in ∂ϵλ/∂φ < 0 (∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0). Although this
relationship is established under the capacity sharing scenario, other service models, e.g., M/M/1 queue, can be studied
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in the same way and have the similar conclusion about the impact of traffic type on the elasticity of throughput6. Based
on the above discussions, the results of Corollary 5.2 and 5.3 can provide important implications for APs and regulators
to choose pricing strategies and regulatory policies under expanded system capacities.
Summary of Implications: From Corollary 5.2 and 5.3, whether an AP would decrease or increase its prices and
whether regulators should relax or enhance price regulation largely depends on the changing direction of the elasticity
of system throughput with changing congestion, which is influenced by the type of data traffic. In particular, in the
early years of the Internet, data traffic was mainly for text content under which the elasticity of throughput often
decreases with congestion. Under this case, when APs expand their capacities, they would lower the two-sided prices
and regulators should relax the price regulation on the side of high market power. However, in recent years, data traffic
is mostly for online video streaming under which the elasticity of throughput usually increases with congestion. Under
this case, APs would increase the prices on both sides with expanded capacity, while regulators might want to tighten
the price regulation on the side of high market power.
5.2 Impact of Users’ Sensitivity
In this subsection, we study the sensitivity of optimal pricing under varying users’ sensitivity to congestion. To model
how sensitive end-users are to network congestion, we extend the gain function to be ρ(ϕ, s), where the parameter s
measures the congestion sensitivity of users. Because when users become more sensitive to congestion, their throughput
gain decreases more sharply with deteriorated congestion, we assume that ∂ρ(ϕ, s1)/∂ϕ > ∂ρ(ϕ, s2)/∂ϕ for all s1 < s2,
which indicates that under any fixed level of congestion ϕ, if users become more sensitive to congestion, the marginal
change in their throughput gain |∂ρ/∂ϕ | increases. Besides, we assume that the inverse Λ(ϕ, µ) of the congestion
function satisfies ∂Λ(ϕ, µ1)/∂ϕ ≤ ∂Λ(ϕ, µ2)/∂ϕ for all µ1 < µ2, which intuitively states that if the AP’s capacity is more
abundant, the marginal change in the implied throughput ∂Λ/∂ϕ will not decrease. Both the congestion functions
Φ = λ/µ and Φ = 1/(µ − λ) used before satisfy this assumption. The following two corollaries show the impacts of the
congestion sensitivity s of users on the profit- and welfare-optimal prices, respectively.
Corollary 5.5. If the elasticity of system throughput increases with congestion, i.e., ∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0, the prices p∗ and q∗
both increase with the users’ sensitivity to congestion s , i.e.,
∂p∗
∂s
> 0 and ∂q
∗
∂s
> 0.
Furthermore, it satisfies that
∂p∗
∂s
: ∂q
∗
∂s
=
dn˜q
dq
: dm˜
p
dp
. (12)
Corollary 5.5 states that if the elasticity of throughput ϵλ increases with congestion φ, the profit-optimal prices
p∗ and q∗ both increase with the users’ sensitivity s . As explained before, the monotonicity condition ∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0
often holds when network throughput is mostly constituted of inelastic traffic, e.g., online video streaming. This result
implies that as video traffic continues to grow, users will become more sensitive to congestion and as a result, APs are
expected to increase the prices on both sides so as to optimize their profits, which also leads to alleviated congestion
and improved users’ experiences. Similar to Equation (11), Equation (12) shows that the marginal profit-optimal prices
(with respect to sensitivity) are proportional to the marginal demand hazard rates (with respect to price) on the opposite
sides.
6Interested readers are referred to Appendix A for details of the case of M/M/1 queuing delay.
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Corollary 5.6. If the elasticity of system throughput increases with congestion, i.e., ∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0, the derivatives of the
prices p◦ and q◦ with respect to the users’ congestion sensitivity s satisfy that
sgn
( ∂p◦
∂s
)
= − sgn
( ∂q◦
∂s
)
= sgn
(
m˜p − n˜q ) .
Corollary 5.6 shows that under the monotonicity condition ∂ϵλ/∂φ > 0, if the demand hazard rate of the user side
m˜p is higher than that of the CP side n˜q , the derivate of p◦ (q◦) with respect to the congestion sensitivity s is positive
(negative), and vice-versa. This result implies that when users become more sensitive to congestion, the welfare-optimal
price of the side whose demand hazard rate is higher (lower) would increase (decrease). By comparing the results of
Corollary 5.5 and 5.6, we find that when the users’ sensitivity to congestion increases, the price of the side of lower
demand hazard rate needs to be reduced under the welfare-optimal pricing, but would be raised under the profit-optimal
counterpart. This suggests that, to protect social welfare, when users become more sensitive to congestion, more
stringent price regulation might need to be imposed on the side where the AP has a higher market power and lower
demand hazard rate.
Summary of Implications: Corollary 5.5 and 5.6 show how APs and regulators should adjust pricing strategies and
regulatory policies under increasing congestion sensitivity of users, when data traffic is mostly for inelastic applications.
In particular, as video traffic keeps growing rapidly, end-users will become more sensitive to the network congestion,
and consequently APs would increase the two-sided prices to alleviate the congestion and improve users’ experiences
so as to maximize profits. From a perspective of social welfare, regulators might want to impose more stringent price
regulation on the side of high market power.
6 EVALUATION OF OPTIMAL PRICING
In the previous sections, we studied the structures and sensitivities of the profit-optimal and welfare-optimal pricing
through theoretical analysis. In this section, we further evaluate the pricing schemes by numerical simulations7.
6.1 Setup of Model Parameters
We first choose the forms of congestion function Φ(λ, µ) and gain function ρ(ϕ, s) to capture detailed characteristics
of network services. In particular, we adopt the congestion functions Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ and Φ(λ, µ) = 1/(µ − λ). The
former models the capacity sharing [5] nature of network services and was used in much prior work [6, 9]; the latter
models the M/M/1 queueing delay, which was also widely used in prior work [5, 24]. We adopt the gain functions
ρ(ϕ, s) = 1/(ϕs+1) and ρ(ϕ, s) = (s+1)−ϕ for s > 0, which were used in prior work [13, 15]. Their congestion elasticities
are ϵρϕ = 1 − 1/(ϕs + 1) and ϵ
ρ
ϕ = ϕ ln(s + 1) and both increase with the congestion sensitivity of users s . This indicates
that the throughput gains will be more elastic to congestion if users become more sensitive to congestion.
Although our analyses have focused on a single AP, market competition among multiple APs could be captured by
the functionm(p) of user population. In particular, we choose a family of population functionsm parameterized by α :
m(p,α) ≜ 1 − p 1α for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,α > 0, which satisfies thatm(p,α1) > m(p,α2) for all α1 < α2. The parameter α can be
regarded as a metric of competition in the user market, i.e., given the same price p, if the competition level α increases,
the user populationm will fall.
The users’ desirable throughput may change rapidly as the traffic demand of content services change. For example, a
new SuperHD video format launched by Netflix requires a 50% increase in traffic flows per video over 1080p content
7Presently, APs usually implement the two-sided schemes in the form of paid peering or sponsored data plan on the CP side, whose pricing information
has remained trade secrets. So there is no public data trace yet to evaluate our two-sided pricing model.
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[22]. Similarly, we extend the function n(q) of average desirable throughput to capture this dynamics. In particular, we
choose a family of throughput function n parameterized by β : n(q, β) ≜ 1 − qβ for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, β > 0, which satisfies
n(q, β1) < n(q, β2) for all β1 < β2. The parameter β can be regarded as a metric of traffic demand of content services,
i.e., given the same price q, if the traffic demand β increases, the desirable throughput will increase.
In the following simulations, we will compare various scenarios with a static baseline with µ = s = α = β = 1 and
c = 0.7, under which the AP’s capacity, the users’ congestion sensitivity, the level of market competition and the traffic
demand of content services are all normalized to one.
6.2 Comparison with One-Sided Pricing
Now we evaluate the AP’s incentive to adopt the two-sided pricing instead of the traditional one-sided pricing that
only charges on the user side. To this end, we denote the AP’s profits by U ∗one and U ∗two under the profit-optimal
one-sided and two-sided pricing, respectively. We define the growth rate of the profit by the two-sided pricing over the
one-sided pricing by r∗ ≜ (U ∗two −U ∗one )/U ∗one . A larger value of r∗ corresponds to a higher profit growth for the AP;
and therefore, leads to a stronger incentive for the AP to adopt the two-sided scheme.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the profit growth rate r∗ as a function of the competition level α and the AP’s capacity µ under
different traffic demand β and users’ sensitivity s , respectively. The subfigures (a) are under the congestion function
Φ = λ/µ and the gain function ρ = 1/(ϕs + 1). From Subfigures (a) to (b), the gain function is changed to ρ = (s + 1)−ϕ .
From Subfigures (a) to (c), the congestion function is changed to Φ = 1/(µ − λ). In Figure 1, we observe that r∗ increases
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with α when the competition level on the user side becomes more intense, and larger values of the traffic demand β
induce higher values of r∗. In Figure 2, we observe that r∗ increases with µ when the AP expands its capacity. Although
r∗ decreases with the sensitivity s in general, it increases with s under small capacity µ when Φ = 1/(µ − λ). Because
under the M/M/1 queueing delay 1/(µ − λ), the network congestion would be severe if the capacity is scarce. The
increase of the users’ sensitivity to congestion makes the network service more valuable for both users and CPs; and
therefore, the AP can obtain a higher profit growth by adopting the two-sided pricing. In fact, the non-monotonic
trends in r∗ happen only when the capacity µ is scarce. To see this more clearly, we plot the case of µ > 2 in Figure 5(a).
From all of Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 5(a), we observe that a high value of s induces a lower value of r∗. In summary, our
observations imply that the AP gets a higher profit growth and has stronger incentive to adopt the two-sided pricing if
1) the AP expands its capacity, 2) the competition level on the user side becomes fiercer, and 3) the content services
require higher traffic throughput.
Next, we evaluate how regulators should deal with the shift from the one-sided pricing to the two-sided pricing. For
this purpose, we denote the social welfare under the welfare-optimal one-sided and two-sided pricing byW ◦one and
W ◦two , respectively. Similarly, we define the growth rate of social welfare by the two-sided pricing over the one-sided
pricing by r◦ ≜ (W ◦two −W ◦one )/W ◦one . A larger value of r◦ indicates that social welfare gets a higher growth when
shifting from the one-sided to the two-sided pricing, and thus regulators might want to encourage this transformation.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the welfare growth rate r◦ as a function of the competition level α and the AP’s capacity µ under
different traffic demand β and users’ sensitivity s , respectively. As a complement to Figure 4(c), Figure 5(b) plots the
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case of large capacity under the M/M/1 queueing setting. By comparing Figures 3, 4 and 5(b) with Figures 1, 2 and 5(a),
respectively, we observe that the welfare growth rate r◦ has the same changing trend as the profit growth rate r∗ when
the parameter µ, s,α or β varies. This observation provides justifications for regulators to encourage the AP to shift
from the one-sided to the two-sided pricing, especially when the AP has strong incentive to do so.
6.3 Impacts of Competition and Demand
Since we have studied the changes of the optimal pricing under varying capacity µ and sensitivity s and provided
analytical results in the previous section, we next focus on understanding the impacts of the competition level α and
traffic demand β on the optimal prices. Figure 6 plots the profit-optimal prices (p∗,q∗) and the welfare-optimal prices
(p◦,q◦) as functions of α and β under the congestion function Φ = λ/µ and the gain function ρ = 1/(ϕs+1). From Figure
6, we observe that 1) when α or β increases, the user-side prices p∗,p◦ decrease and the CP-side prices q∗,q◦ increase,
and 2) the welfare-optimal prices p◦ and q◦ are always lower than the profit-optimal prices p∗ and q∗, respectively. The
first observation implies that as the APs’ competition in the user market becomes more intense or the content services
have larger traffic demand, the user-side price will decrease and the CP-side price will increase, regardless whether
the objective is the AP’s profit or social welfare. The second observation indicates that, to optimize social welfare,
regulators might want to regulate the prices on both the user and CP sides, which coincides with the implication of
Proposition 4.3. Note that we omit the cases when the congestion function is Φ = 1/(µ − λ) or/and the gain function is
ρ = (s + 1)−ϕ . Because in the cases, the changing trends of the optimal prices under varying α and β are the same as
those shown in Figure 6.
Summary of Implications: Our observations in this section imply that as the capacities of APs and the demand
for video traffic grow in the current Internet, APs will have increasing incentives to transform from the traditional
one-sided pricing on the user side to the two-sided pricing. Under these cases, regulators might want to encourage this
transformation, since it will bring higher growth rates for both social welfare and APs’ profits.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the optimal two-sided pricing for congested networks. We present a novel model to capture end-
users’ population and throughput demand under pricing and congestion parameters and derive the system congestion
under an equilibrium. Based on this model, we characterize the structures of the profit-optimal and welfare-optimal
pricing schemes. Our results reveal that the profit-optimal pricing always equalizes the demand hazard rates at both
On Optimal Two-Sided Pricing of Congested Networks
,
0.5 1 1.5 2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
p$
p/
,
0.5 1 1.5 2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
q$
q/
-
0.5 1 1.5 2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
p$
p/
-
0.5 1 1.5 2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
q$
q/
Fig. 6. The profit-optimal and welfare-optimal pricing schemes under varying α and β .
sides, while the welfare-optimal counterpart differentiates them based on the elasticity of system throughput. We
also explore the sensitivities of the optimal pricing under varying system parameters. We find that with the growth
of APs’ capacities and end-users’ traffic demand in the current Internet, APs will have increasing incentives to shift
from the traditional one-sided pricing to the two-sided pricing, because it brings higher growth rates for their profits.
Furthermore, as online video streaming becomes the main source of network traffic and keeps growing rapidly, end-users
become more sensitive to the network congestion and APs are expanding their capacities. Under such scenarios, APs
may increase two-sided prices to alleviate the congestion and improve users’ experiences so as to maximize profits.
From the perspective of social welfare, regulators might want to tighten the price regulation on the side where APs
have higher market power and lower demand hazard rate.
A THE CASE OF M/M/1 QUEUE
In Section 5.1, we showed that for the capacity sharing scenario, we have the result that if the data traffic is for text
(online video), the elasticity of throughput ϵλ decreases (increases) with congestion under a reasonable condition. The
condition is that the congestion elasticity of throughput gain of text (online video) traffic increases (decreases) with
congestion. In this section, we show that for the congestion model of M/M/1 queue, we can derive the similar result
under another reasonable condition.
For the scenario of M/M/1 queue, the congestion function is Φ(λ, µ) = 1/(µ − λ) and its inverse function with respect
to the throughput λ is Λ(ϕ, µ) = µ − 1/ϕ. By Equation (1), the elasticity of system throughput ϵλ can be expressed as
ϵλ(φ) = 11 +mnG(φ) (13)
where G(φ) ≜ −φ2dρ(φ)/dφ. By Equation (13), the elasticity of throughput ϵλ decreases with G. When the data traffic
is for text, the throughput gain ρ(φ) usually decreases concavely in congestion φ, i.e., d2ρ(φ)/dφ2 < 0, as text traffic is
insensitive to mild congestion. Under such a case, we have thatG(φ) increases with congestion φ, i.e., dG(φ)/dφ > 0.
Conversely, when the data traffic is for online video, we consider thatG(φ) often decreases with congestion φ. Therefore,
under the condition that the function G(φ) for text (online video) traffic increases (decreases) with congestion, we have
the conclusion that if the data traffic is for text (online video), the elasticity of throughput ϵλ decreases (increases) with
congestion by Equation (13).
B PROOFS OF THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the proofs of the theoretical results mentioned in our paper.
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Proof of Theorem 3.6: By Assumption 3.4, Φ(λ, µ) is increasing in λ and thus its inverse function Λ(ϕ, µ) is increasing
in ϕ. By Assumption 3.3, λ(ϕ) is decreasing in ϕ and therefore д(ϕ) = Λ(ϕ, µ) − λ(ϕ) is increasing in ϕ. Because д(ϕ) is a
continuously increasing function of ϕ and it satisfies that
д
(
Φ(0, µ)) = Λ(Φ(0, µ), µ) − λ (Φ(0, µ)) = −λ (Φ(0, µ)) < 0 and
lim
ϕ→+∞
д(ϕ) = lim
ϕ→+∞
[Λ(ϕ, µ) − λ(ϕ)] = lim
ϕ→+∞
Λ(ϕ, µ) > 0,
the equation д(ϕ) = 0 must have a unique solution on the interval [Φ(0, µ),+∞) by the intermediate value theorem.
Because the minimum of ϕ is Φ(0, µ) under which the aggregate throughput λ is zero, there always exists a unique
congestion ϕ which solves д(ϕ) = 0, i.e., satisfies ϕ = Φ(λ(ϕ), µ) and is an equilibrium congestion by Definition 3.5. □
Proof of Proposition 3.7: Under the equilibrium of the system (m,n, µ), Λ and λ are functions of m,n, µ and we
denote them by Λ(m,n, µ) ≜ Λ (φ(m,n, µ), µ) and λ(m,n, µ) ≜ λ (m,n,φ(m,n, µ)) =mnρ (φ(m,n, µ)). Correspondingly,
we denote the throughput gap by д(m,n, µ) ≜ Λ(m,n, µ) − λ(m,n, µ). By Theorem 3.6, under the equilibrium, the
throughput gap д(m,n, µ) is zero for anym,n, and µ. Thus, for the user populationm, we have the identity that
∂д(m,n, µ)
∂m
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂m
− ∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂m
= 0 where ∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂m
=
λ(m,n,φ)
∂m
+
∂λ(m,n,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂m
.
Based on this identity, we can derive that
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂m
=
(
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
− ∂λ(m,n,φ)
∂φ
)−1 λ(m,n,φ)
∂m
=
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1 λ
m
> 0
where we denote д(m,n, µ,φ) ≜ Λ(φ, µ) − λ(m,n,φ). Furthermore, we have that
∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂m
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂m
> 0.
Similarly, for the average throughput n, we can derive that
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂n
=
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1 λ
n
> 0 and ∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂n
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂n
> 0.
For the AP’s capacity µ, we have the identity that
∂д(m,n, µ)
∂µ
=
(
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂µ
+
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
)
− ∂λ(m,n,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂µ
= 0
from which we can derive that
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂µ
= − ∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
(
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
− ∂λ(m,n,φ)
∂φ
)−1
= − ∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
< 0.
Furthermore, it satisfies that
∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂µ
=
∂λ(m,n,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂µ
=mn
dρ(φ)
dφ
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂µ
> 0. □
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Proof of Theorem 3.8: Based on Definition 3.1 and Proposition 3.7, we have the identities that
ϵλm =
∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂m
(
λ
m
)−1
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
and
ϵλn =
∂λ(m,n, µ)
∂n
(
λ
n
)−1
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
where it satisfies that
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)/∂φ
∂Λ(φ, µ)/∂φ − ∂λ(m,n,φ)/∂φ =
(
1 + |∂λ(m,n,φ)/∂φ |
∂Λ(φ, µ)/∂φ
)−1
∈ (0, 1]. □
Proof of Proposition 3.9: From Proposition 3.7, we can derive that
∂φ(p,q, µ)
∂p
=
∂φ(m,n, µ)
∂m
dm(p)
dp
=
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1 λ
m
dm(p)
dp
= −
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
λm˜p < 0,
and therefore we have that
∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂p
=
∂Λ(p,q, µ)
∂p
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(p,q, µ)
∂p
< 0
where we denote Λ(p,q, µ) ≜ Λ (φ(p,q, µ), µ). Similarly, we can derive that
∂φ(p,q, µ)
∂q
= −
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
λn˜q < 0 and ∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂q
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(p,q, µ)
∂q
< 0.
Besides, by Theorem 3.8, it satisfies that
ϵλp : ϵλq =
(
ϵλmϵ
m
p
)
:
(
ϵλnϵ
n
q
)
= ϵmp : ϵnq . □
Proof of Proposition 4.1: From Proposition 3.7 and Equation (1), the impact of the capacity µ on the profit is
∂U (p,q, µ)
∂µ
= (p + q − c) ∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂µ
= (p + q − c) ∂λ(m(p),n(q), µ)
∂µ
= −(p + q − c) ∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
mn
dρ(φ)
∂φ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
= (p + q − c) ∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
(1 − ϵλ) > 0.
From Proposition 3.9 and Equation (1), the impacts of the two-sided prices on the profit are
∂U (p,q, µ)
∂p
=λ+(p + q − c) ∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂p
=λ−(p + q − c) ∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
λm˜p =λ−(p + q − c)ϵλλm˜p ,
∂U (p,q, µ)
∂q
=λ+(p + q − c) ∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂q
=λ−(p + q − c) ∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
λn˜q =λ−(p + q − c)ϵλλn˜q . □
Proof of Theorem 4.2: By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) necessary conditions and Proposition 4.1, if the two-sided
prices (p,q) maximize the profitU , we have the relations that
∂U (p,q, µ)
∂p
= λ − (p + q − c)ϵλλm˜p = 0
∂U (p,q, µ)
∂q
= λ − (p + q − c)ϵλλm˜q = 0
(14)
from which we can derive Equation (4), i.e.,
m˜p = n˜q =
1
(p + q − c)ϵλ .
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Furthermore, by Definition 3.1 and 3.2, it satisfies that
ϵλϵmp = ϵ
λpm˜p =
p
p + q − c
ϵλϵnq = ϵ
λqn˜q =
q
p + q − c
from which the total price p + q satisfies that
p + q
p + q − c = ϵ
λϵmp + ϵ
λϵnq = ϵ
λ
p + ϵ
λ
q
and thus Equation (5) holds. □
Proof of Proposition 4.3: From Proposition 3.7, the impact of the capacity µ on social welfareW is
∂W (p,q, µ)
∂µ
= (sm + sn ) ∂λ(m(p),n(q), µ)
∂µ
=
W
λ
∂λ(m(p),n(q), µ)
∂µ
= − W
mnρ(φ)mn
dρ(φ)
dφ
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
=W ρ˜φ
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂µ
(
∂д(m,n, µ,φ)
∂φ
)−1
> 0.
From Proposition 3.9 and Equation (1), the impact of the user-side price p on social welfareW is
∂W (p,q, µ)
∂p
=
dsm (p)
dp
λ +
(
sm + sn
) ∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂p
=
d
dp
(
Sm
m
)
λ − (sm + sn )λϵλm˜p
=
(
−Sm
m2
dm(p)
dp
+
1
m
dSm (p)
dp
)
λ − (sm + sn )λϵλm˜p = (smm˜p − 1) λ − (sm + sn )λϵλm˜p
=
(
Wmm˜
p − λ) −W ϵλm˜p = −λ − m˜p [Wn −W (1 − ϵλ)]
where dSm (p)
dp
= −m(p) by the definitions of Sm (p) andm(p) in Equation (7) and (2). Similarly, the impact of the CP-side
price q on social welfareW is
∂W (p,q, µ)
∂q
= −λ − n˜q
[
Wm −W (1 − ϵλ)
]
.
When S˜pm increases with the price p, we have that
dS˜
p
m (p)
dp
=
d
dp
(
m
Sm
)
=
∂
∂p
(
1
sm
)
= −dsm (p)
dp
(
1
sm
)2
> 0
and thus dsm (p)
dp
< 0 holds. Based on this condition, we have that
∂W (p,q, µ)
∂p
=
dsm (p)
dp
λ +
(
sm + sn
) ∂λ(p,q, µ)
∂p
<
dsm (p)
dp
λ < 0
implying thatW decreases with p. Similarly, we can proof that when S˜qn increases with q,W decreases with q. □
Proof of Theorem 4.4: If prices p and q maximize social welfareW and have a fixed total value, we have the first
order condition
∂W (p,q, µ)
∂p
− ∂W (p,q, µ)
∂q
= 0.
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By Proposition 4.3, we can derive that
m˜p
Wm −W (1 − ϵλ)
=
n˜q
Wn −W (1 − ϵλ)
.
Substituting the relationsWm = smλ andWn = snλ, we can get the equation that
m˜p
sm − (sm + sn )(1 − ϵλ)
=
n˜q
sn − (sm + sn )(1 − ϵλ)
and thus Equation (8) holds. □
Proof of Corollary 5.2: Under any fixed capacity µ, the two-sided price (p,q) determines the AP’s profit U . Thus
the profit is a function of the price and we can denote it byU (p,q) ≜ U (p,q, µ). We use H (p,q) to denote the Hessian
matrix of the profit functionU (p,q), defined by
H (p,q) ≜

∂2U (p,q)
∂p2
∂2U (p,q)
∂p∂q
∂2U (p,q)
∂q∂p
∂2U (p,q)
∂q2

=

∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂p2
∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂p∂q
∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂q∂p
∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂q2

.
We denote the determinant of H (p,q) by
D(p,q) ≜ det (H (p,q)) = ∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂p2
∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂q2
− ∂
2U (p,q, µ)
∂p∂q
∂2U (p,q, µ)
∂q∂p
.
Because the profit-optimal price (p∗,q∗) is unique for any given capacity µ, the prices p∗ and q∗ are functions of µ and
thus we can write them as p∗(µ) and q∗(µ). Moreover, the unique profit-optimal price (p∗,q∗) satisfies the first order
condition
∂U
(
p∗,q∗, µ
)
∂p∗ =
∂U
(
p∗,q∗, µ
)
∂q∗ = 0, (15)
thus it is a critical point of the profit functionU . Because (p∗,q∗) is also a strict local maximum ofU , we have that
D(p∗,q∗) = ∂
2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(p∗)2
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗∂p∗
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗∂q∗ ≥ 0
by second partial derivative test.
Next, we prove the impact of the capacity µ on the optimal prices p∗ and q∗. By the identity in Equation (15), there
exists the identity that
d
dµ
(
∂U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗
)
=
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(p∗)2
∂p∗(µ)
∂µ
+
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗∂p∗
∂q∗(µ)
∂µ
+
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂p∗ = 0
d
dµ
( ∂U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗
)
=
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗∂q∗
∂p∗(µ)
∂µ
+
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(q∗)2
∂q∗(µ)
∂µ
+
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂q∗ = 0
from which we can derive that
∂p∗(µ)
∂µ
=
−1
D(p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(q∗)2
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂p∗ −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗∂p∗
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂q∗
)
∂q∗(µ)
∂µ
=
−1
D(p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(p∗)2
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂q∗ −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗∂q∗
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂p∗
)
.
(16)
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We denote the inverse function of system congestion φ
(
m(p),n(q), µ) with respect to µ by Ξ(m(p),n(q),φ) . By Equation
(1), the elasticity ϵλ of system throughput can be written as a function of p,q, and φ:
ϵλ(p,q,φ) =
(
1 − m(p)n(q)dρ(φ)/dφ
∂Λ(φ,Ξ)/∂φ
)−1
.
By Equation (14), we can derive that
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂p∗ =
∂
∂µ
[
λ(p∗,q∗, µ) − (p∗ + q∗ − c)ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)λ(p∗,q∗, µ)m˜p (p∗)
]
=
∂λ(p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ
[
1−(p∗+q∗−c)ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)m˜p (p∗)
]
− (p∗+q∗−c) ∂ϵ
λ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ
λ(p∗,q∗, µ)m˜p (p∗)
= −(p∗ + q∗ − c) ∂ϵ
λ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ
λ(p∗,q∗, µ)m˜p (p∗).
Similarly, we can derive that
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂q∗ = −(p
∗ + q∗ − c) ∂ϵ
λ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ
λ(p∗,q∗, µ)n˜q (q∗).
By Theorem 4.2, m˜p (p∗) = n˜q (q∗) and thus it satisfies that ∂
2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂p∗ =
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂q∗ . Because
∂φ(p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ
< 0
by Proposition 3.7, we have that
sgn
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂p∗
)
= sgn
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂µ∂q∗
)
= sgn
(
∂ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
)
. (17)
Besides, by the monotone conditions in Assumption 5.1, we have dm˜
p (p∗)
dp
,
dn˜q (q∗)
dq
> 0, and therefore, by Proposition
4.1, we can derive that
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗∂p∗ = −(p
∗ + q∗ − c)λ(p∗,q∗, µ)ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)dn˜
q (q∗)
dq
< 0
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(p∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗∂q∗ = −(p
∗ + q∗ − c)λ(p∗,q∗, µ)ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)dm˜
p (p∗)
dp
< 0.
(18)
Combining Equation (16), (17) and (18), we can derive that the signs of the marginal prices satisfiy
sgn
(
∂p∗(µ)
∂µ
)
= sgn
[
−1
D(p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗∂p∗
)
∂ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
]
= sgn
(
∂ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
)
sgn
(
∂q∗(µ)
∂µ
)
= sgn
[
−1
D(p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(p∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗∂q∗
)
∂ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
]
= sgn
(
∂ϵλ(p∗,q∗,φ)
∂φ
)
.
and the ratio of the marginal prices satisfies
∂p∗(µ)
∂µ
: ∂q
∗(µ)
∂µ
=
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂q∗∂p∗
)
:
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂(p∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ)
∂p∗∂q∗
)
=
dn˜q (q∗)
dq
: dm˜
p (p∗)
dp
. □
Proof ofCorollary 5.3:Under the constraintp+q = c , the social welfareW can be denoted byW (p, µ) ≜W (p, c−p, µ) =
W (p,q, µ). Because p◦ is the unique welfare-optimal price for any given capacity µ, the price p◦ is a function of µ and
thus we can write it as p◦(µ). Moreover, the unique profit-optimal price p◦ must be a strict local maximum of the welfare
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functionW , thus we have the first order condition for any capacity µ:
∂W (p◦, µ)
∂p◦ =
∂W (p◦,q◦, µ)
∂p◦ −
∂W (p◦,q◦, µ)
∂q◦ = n˜
q (q◦)
[
Wm (p◦,q◦, µ) −W (p◦,q◦, µ)(1 − ϵλ(p◦,q◦,φ))
]
− m˜p (p◦)
[
Wn (p◦,q◦, µ) −W (p◦,q◦, µ)(1 − ϵλ(p◦,q◦,φ))
]
= 0 (19)
by Proposition 4.3. So there exists the identity that
d
dµ
(
∂W (p◦, µ)
∂p◦
)
=
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂(p◦)2
∂p◦(µ)
∂µ
+
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂µ∂p◦ = 0
from we can derive that
∂p◦(µ)
∂µ
= −
(
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂(p◦)2
)−1
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂µ∂p◦ . (20)
By Equation (19), it satisfies that
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂µ∂p◦ =
1
λ(p◦,q◦, µ)
∂λ(p◦,q◦, µ)
∂µ
∂W (p◦, µ)
∂p◦ −
(
m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦))W (p◦,q◦, µ) ∂ϵλ(p◦,q◦,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p◦,q◦, µ)
∂µ
= −(m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦))W (p◦,q◦, µ) ∂ϵλ(p◦,q◦,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p◦,q◦, µ)
∂µ
.
Because ∂φ(p
◦,q◦, µ)
∂µ
< 0 from Proposition 3.7, it satisfies that
sgn
(
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂µ∂p◦
)
= sgn
(
m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦)) · sgn ( ∂ϵλ(p◦,q◦,φ)
∂φ
)
.
Because p◦ is a strict local maximum ofW , we have the second order condition ∂
2W (p◦, µ)
∂(p◦)2 < 0. Furthermore, by
Equation (20), the sign of the marginal price is
sgn
(
∂p◦(µ)
∂µ
)
= sgn
(
∂2W (p◦, µ)
∂µ∂p◦
)
= sgn
(
m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦)) · sgn ( ∂ϵλ(p◦,q◦,φ)
∂φ
)
.
Besides, under the constraint p◦ +q◦ = c , we have q◦(µ) = c −p◦(µ) for any capacity µ and thus there exists the identity
that sgn
(
∂p◦(µ)
∂µ
)
= − sgn
(
∂q◦(µ)
∂µ
)
. □
Proof of Proposition 5.4: If the congestion function is Φ(λ, µ) = λ/µ, its inverse function with respect to λ is
Λ(ϕ, µ) = ϕµ. From Equation (1) and Definition 3.1, the elasticity of system throughput satisfies that
ϵλ =
(
1 − mndρ(φ)/dφ
∂Λ(φ, µ)/∂φ
)−1
=
(
1 − mndρ(φ)/dφ
µ
)−1
=
(
1 − mnφ
λ
dρ(φ)
dφ
)−1
=
(
1 − mnφ
mnρ
dρ(φ)
dφ
)−1
=
1
1 + ϵρφ
. □
Proof of Corollary 5.5:When the gain function is extended to be ρ(ϕ, s), the system congestion and throughput are
extended to be φ(p,q, µ, s) and
λ(p,q, µ, s) ≜ λ (p,q, s,φ(p,q, µ, s)) =m(p)n(q)ρ (φ(p,q, µ, s), s ), (21)
Wang et al.
respectively. Correspondingly, we can denote the AP’s profit byU (p,q, µ, s) ≜ (p + q − c)λ(p,q, µ, s). Under any fixed
capacity µ and sensitivity s , the two-sided price (p,q) determines the AP’s profitU . Thus the profit is a function of the
price and we can denote it byU (p,q) ≜ U (p,q, µ, s). We use Hs (p,q) to denote the Hessian matrix of the profit function
U (p,q), defined by
Hs (p,q) ≜

∂2U (p,q)
∂p2
∂2U (p,q)
∂p∂q
∂2U (p,q)
∂q∂p
∂2U (p,q)
∂q2

=

∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂p2
∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂p∂q
∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂q∂p
∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂q2

We denote the determinant of Hs (p,q) by
Ds (p,q) ≜ det
(
Hs (p,q)
)
=
∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂p2
∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂q2
− ∂
2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂p∂q
∂2U (p,q, µ, s)
∂q∂p
.
Because the profit-optimal price (p∗,q∗) is unique for any given capacity µ and sensitivity s , the prices p∗ and q∗ are
functions of µ and s and thus we can write them as p∗(µ, s) and q∗(µ, s). Moreover, the unique profit-optimal price
(p∗,q∗) satisfies the first order condition
∂U
(
p∗,q∗, µ, s
)
∂p∗ =
∂U
(
p∗,q∗, µ, s
)
∂q∗ = 0, (22)
thus it is a critical point of the profit functionU . Because (p∗,q∗) is also a strict local maximum ofU , we have that
Ds (p∗,q∗) = ∂
2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(p∗)2
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂q∗∂p∗
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂p∗∂q∗ ≥ 0
by second partial derivative test. Similar to Equation(16), we can derive that
∂p∗(µ, s)
∂s
=
−1
Ds (p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(q∗)2
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂p∗ −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂q∗∂p∗
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂q∗
)
∂q∗(µ, s)
∂s
=
−1
Ds (p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(p∗)2
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂q∗ −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂p∗∂q∗
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂p∗
)
.
(23)
Because the gain function satisfies ∂ρ(ϕ, s1)
∂ϕ
>
∂ρ(ϕ, s2)
∂ϕ
for ∀s1 < s2, i.e., ∂
2ρ
∂ϕ∂s
< 0, we can derive that
∂ρ(ϕ, s)
∂s
=
∫ ϕ
0
∂2ρ(t , s)
∂t∂s
dt < 0. (24)
Furthermore, under the identity д(p,q, µ, s) ≜ Λ(φ(p,q, µ, s), µ) − λ(p,q, µ, s) = 0, we can derive that
∂д(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
− ∂λ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
=
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
∂φ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
− ∂λ(p,q, s,φ)
∂s
− ∂λ(p,q, s,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
= 0.
from which we have
∂φ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
=
∂λ(p,q, s,φ)
∂s
(
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
− ∂λ(p,q, s,φ)
∂φ
)−1
=mn
∂ρ(φ, s)
∂s
(
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
− ∂λ(p,q, s,φ)
∂φ
)−1
< 0. (25)
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Furthermore, by Equation (1), it satisfies that
∂ϵλ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂s
=m(p)n(q)(ϵλ)2 ∂
2ρ(φ, s)/∂φ∂s
∂Λ(φ, µ)/∂φ < 0. (26)
Because the inverse Λ of the congestion function satisfies ∂Λ(ϕ, µ1)
∂ϕ
≤ ∂Λ(ϕ, µ2)
∂ϕ
for all µ1 < µ2, i.e.,
∂2Λ
∂ϕ∂µ
≥ 0, by
Equation (1), we have that
∂ϵλ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂µ
= −mn(ϵλ)2 ∂ρ(φ, s)
∂φ
∂2Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ∂µ
(
∂Λ(φ, µ)
∂φ
)−2
≥ 0. (27)
We denote the inverse of the equilibrium congestion function φ(p,q, µ, s) with respect to µ by Ξ(p,q,φ, s) and denote
ϵλ(p,q,φ, s) ≜ ϵλ (p,q,Ξ(p,q,φ, s), s,φ) . By Equation (27) and the assumption ∂ϵλ(p,q,φ, s)
∂φ
> 0 in Corollary 5.5, we
can derive that
∂ϵλ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂φ
=
∂ϵλ(p,q,φ, s)
∂φ
− ∂ϵ
λ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂µ
∂Ξ(p,q,φ, s)
∂φ
> − ∂ϵ
λ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂µ
∂Ξ(p,q,φ, s)
∂φ
= − ∂ϵ
λ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂µ
(
∂φ(p,q, µ, s)
∂µ
)−1
≥ 0. (28)
Furthermore, by Equation (25), (26) and (28), we derive
∂ϵλ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
=
∂ϵλ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂s
+
∂ϵλ(p,q, µ, s,φ)
∂φ
∂φ(p,q, µ, s)
∂s
< 0. (29)
Based on Proposition 4.1, Theorem 4.2 and Equation (29), we have the relation that
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂p∗ = −(p
∗ + q∗ − c)λ(p∗,q∗, µ, s) ∂ϵ
λ(p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s
m˜p (p∗)
= −(p∗ + q∗ − c)λ(p∗,q∗, µ, s) ∂ϵ
λ(p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s
n˜q (q∗) = ∂
2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂q∗ > 0. (30)
Besides, by the monotone conditions in Assumption 5.1, we have dm˜
p (p∗)
dp
,
dn˜q (q∗)
dq
> 0, and therefore, by Proposition
4.1, we can derive that
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂q∗∂p∗ = −(p
∗ + q∗ − c)λ(p∗,q∗, µ, s)ϵλ(p∗,q∗, µ, s)dn˜
q (q∗)
dq
< 0
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(p∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂p∗∂q∗ = −(p
∗ + q∗ − c)λ(p∗,q∗, µ, s)ϵλ(p∗,q∗, µ, s)dm˜
p (p∗)
dp
< 0.
Combining it with Equation (23) and (30), we further have
∂p∗(µ, s)
∂s
=
−1
Ds (p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂q∗∂p∗
)
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂p∗ > 0
∂q∗(µ, s)
∂s
=
−1
Ds (p∗,q∗)
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(p∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂p∗∂q∗
)
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂s∂q∗ > 0
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showing that the optimal prices p∗ and q∗ both increase with the congestion sensitivity s and the ratio of the marginal
prices satisfies that
∂p∗(µ, s)
∂s
: ∂q
∗(µ, s)
∂s
=
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(q∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂q∗∂p∗
)
:
(
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂(p∗)2 −
∂2U (p∗,q∗, µ, s)
∂p∗∂q∗
)
=
dn˜q (q∗)
dq
: dm˜
p (p∗)
dp
. □
Proof of Corollary 5.6: When the gain function is extended to be ρ(ϕ, s), we can denote the social welfare by
W (p,q, µ, s) ≜ (sm (p) + sn (q))λ(p,q, µ, s) based on Equation (21). Under the constraint p + q = c , the social welfareW
can be denoted byW (p, µ, s) ≜W (p, c − p, µ, s) =W (p,q, µ, s). Because p◦ is the unique welfare-optimal price for any
given capacity µ and sensitivity s , the price p◦ is a function of µ and s and thus we can write it as p◦(µ, s). Moreover,
the unique profit-optimal price p◦ must be a strict local maximum of the welfare functionW , thus we have the first
order condition for any capacity µ and sensitivity s:
∂W (p◦, µ, s)
∂p◦ =
∂W (p◦,q◦, µ, s)
∂p◦ −
∂W (p◦,q◦, µ, s)
∂q◦ = n˜
q (q◦)
[
Wm (p◦,q◦, µ, s)−W (p◦,q◦, µ, s)
(
1 − ϵλ(p◦,q◦, µ, s)) ]
− m˜p (p◦)
[
Wn (p◦,q◦, µ, s) −W (p◦,q◦, µ, s)
(
1 − ϵλ(p◦,q◦, µ, s)) ] = 0 (31)
by Proposition 4.3. Similar to Equation (20), we can derive that
∂p◦(µ, s)
∂s
= −
(
∂2W (p◦, µ, s)
∂(p◦)2
)−1
∂2W (p◦, µ, s)
∂s∂p◦ . (32)
By Equation (31), we can derive that
∂2W (p◦, µ, s)
∂s∂p◦ =
1
λ
∂λ(p◦,q◦, µ, s)
∂s
∂W (p◦, µ, s)
∂p◦ −
(
m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦))W (p◦, µ, s) ∂ϵλ(p◦,q◦, µ, s)
∂s
= −(m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦))W (p◦, µ, s) ∂ϵλ(p◦,q◦, µ, s)
∂s
.
By Equation (29), it satisfies that
sgn
(
∂2W (p◦, µ, s)
∂s∂p◦
)
= sgn
(
m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦)) .
Because p◦ is a strict local maximum ofW , we have the second order condition ∂
2W (p◦, µ, s)
∂(p◦)2 < 0. Furthermore, by
Equation (32), the sign of the marginal price satisfies that
sgn
(
∂p◦(µ, s)
∂s
)
= sgn
(
∂2W (p◦, µ, s)
∂s∂p◦
)
= sgn
(
m˜p (p◦) − n˜q (q◦)) .
Besides, under the constraint p◦ + q◦ = c , we have q◦(µ, s) = c − p◦(µ, s) for any µ, s and thus there exists the identity
that sgn
(
∂p◦(µ, s)
∂s
)
= − sgn
(
∂q◦(µ, s)
∂s
)
. □
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